The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has compiled a series of reports on restrictions to movement of Palestinians within the Occupied Territories and between the Occupied Territories and Israel.
1 The OCHA records whether there were any restrictions to the movement of Palestinians at each of 88 checkpoints in the West Bank and Gaza from 1 October 2003 to the end of our sample period. Using these reports, we assigned a daily value to each checkpoint, ranging from 1 (completely closed) to 5 (completely open). In
Appendix table I.1 we give some examples of how we transformed the verbal descriptions in the OCHA reports into a numeric scale. We excluded checkpoints that appear in the OCHA reports for a total of less than 365 days, leaving a total of 45 checkpoints in our sample. These are presumably the most important checkpoints in the Occupied Territories. Our results are not sensitive to using all 88 checkpoints, or only checkpoints in the West Bank, or only checkpoints on the border between the Territories and Israel. We then calculated for each day the fraction of checkpoints that were completely closed, and used that as our measure of Israeli vigilance. We note that often a checkpoint was completely closed because of a "hot" security warning, leading us to believe that the measure we use is indeed a good proxy for Israeli vigilance and for the level of Palestinian violence anticipated by the Israeli security forces. The average percentage of checkpoints that were completely closed was 15.6 percent, with a standard deviation of 5.6 percent.
In Appendix Table I Table I We use these data to estimate a series of Palestinian reaction functions. These estimates are presented in columns 1 through 3 of Appendix Table 1 , with dependent variables being the total number of Palestinian attacks, the number of prevented attacks, and the number of successful attacks, respectively. Because the data are measured only at a monthly frequency, we have 51 observations, and therefore include as regressors only one lag of Palestinian and Israeli fatalities as well as our period indicators and the completed length of the separation barrier variable. In the first column, we find no correlation between the total level of intended Palestinian violence (both successful and unsuccessful) and the lagged number of Palestinian fatalities. We also find no quantitatively or statistically significant relationship between the number of prevented attacks and past Israeli violence, in column 2. In the third column we simply reproduce the results on realized violence presented previously, this time using the IDF count of successful attacks instead of the B'Tselem data. Whether measured using successful 2 Unsuccessful attacks include those that were either thwarted by a preventive action by the IDF or the General Security Service, or were not carried out because of "work accidents" or other failures in the execution of the attack. These data are publicly available on a monthly frequency from the IDF web site. Unfortunately, higher frequency data on successful and unsuccessful attacks is not made available to the public for security reasons, preventing us from analyzing whether the intended level of Palestinian violence responds to Israeli violence in the short run.
(fatal) attacks, unsuccessful attacks, or total attacks, we continue to find no effect of lagged Palestinian fatalities on the level of Palestinian violence.
In the last column of the table, we use as the proxy for intended violence the monthly average of terror warnings per day received by Israel's security forces, available for 2004 and 2005 . Terror warnings can take many forms, ranging from a detailed notification of a terrorist operation to take place at a specific time and place, to a more general warning about the intentions of militant groups to carry out attacks.
3 Again, we find no evidence that the overall number of Palestinian fatalities raises the number of terror warnings. Indeed, the coefficient in column 4 is small in magnitude and negative. We are hesitant to place too much weight on these results, however, because of the small number of observations (24), and because they encompass the period of "declared calm" announced by Hamas after the election of Mahmoud Abbas in January 2005. 4 It is nevertheless striking that there is no hint of a positive correlation between lagged Israeli violence and the number of terror warnings.
While of course we are cautious about placing too much emphasis on results based on regressions with so few observations, the estimates confirm the results of our previous analysis.
The preponderance of evidence suggests that the Palestinians do not respond in a systematic way to Israeli violence, regardless of whether the Palestinians' response is measured by realized fatalities or by intended violence. 
